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Abstract
Adversarial training is one of the main defenses against adversarial attacks. In this
paper, we provide the first rigorous study on diagnosing elements of adversarial
training, which reveals two intriguing properties.
First, we study the role of normalization. Batch normalization (BN) is a crucial
element for achieving state-of-the-art performance on many vision tasks, but we
show it may prevent networks from obtaining strong robustness in adversarial
training. One unexpected observation is that, for models trained with BN, simply
removing clean images from training data largely boosts adversarial robustness,
i.e., 18.3%. We relate this phenomenon to the hypothesis that clean images and
adversarial images are drawn from two different domains. This two-domain hy-
pothesis may explain the issue of BN when training with a mixture of clean and
adversarial images, as estimating normalization statistics of this mixture distribu-
tion is challenging. Guided by this two-domain hypothesis, we show disentangling
the mixture distribution for normalization, i.e., applying separate BNs to clean
and adversarial images for statistics estimation, achieves much stronger robustness.
Additionally, we find that enforcing BNs to behave consistently at training and
testing can further enhance robustness.
Second, we study the role of network capacity. We find our so-called “deep”
networks are still shallow for the task of adversarial learning. Unlike traditional
classification tasks where accuracy is only marginally improved by adding more
layers to “deep” networks (e.g., ResNet-152), adversarial training exhibits a much
stronger demand on deeper networks to achieve higher adversarial robustness. This
robustness improvement can be observed substantially and consistently even by
pushing the network capacity to an unprecedented scale, i.e., ResNet-638.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks [18] can mislead neural networks to make wrong predictions by adding human
imperceptible perturbations to input data. Adversarial training [6] is shown to be an effective method
to defend against such attacks, which trains neural networks on adversarial images that are generated
on-the-fly during training. Later works further improve robustness of adversarially trained models by
mitigating gradient masking [19], imposing logits pairing [10], denoising at feature space [23], etc.
However, these works mainly focus on justifying the effectiveness of proposed strategies and apply
inconsistent pipelines for adversarial training, which leaves revealing important elements for training
robust models still a missing piece in current adversarial research.
In this paper, we provide the first rigorous diagnosis of different adversarial learning strategies, under
a unified training and testing framework, on the large-scale ImageNet dataset [16]. We discover two
intriguing properties of adversarial training, which are essential for training models with stronger
robustness. First, though batch normalization (BN) [9] is known as a crucial component for achieving
state-of-the-arts on many vision tasks, it may become a major obstacle for securing robustness against
strong attacks in the context of adversarial training. By training such networks adversarially with
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different strategies, e.g., imposing logits pairing [10], we observe an unexpected phenomenon —
removing clean images from training data is the most effective way for boosting model robustness.
We relate this phenomenon to the conjecture that clean images and adversarial images are drawn
from two different domains. This two-domain hypothesis may explain the limitation of BN when
training with a mixture of clean and adversarial images, as estimating normalization statistics on this
mixture distribution is challenging. We further show that adversarial training without removing clean
images can also obtain strong robustness, if the mixture distribution is well disentangled at BN by
constructing different mini-batches for clean images and adversarial images to estimate normalization
statistics, i.e., one set of BNs exclusively for adversarial images and another set of BNs exclusively
for clean images. An alternative solution to avoiding mixture distribution for normalization is to
simply replace all BNs with batch-unrelated normalization layers, e.g., group normalization [22],
where normalization statistics are estimated on each image independently. These facts indicate that
model robustness is highly related to normalization in adversarial training. Furthermore, additional
performance gain is observed via enforcing consistent behavior of BN during training and testing.
Second, we find that our so-called “deep” networks (e.g., ResNet-152) are still shallow for the task of
adversarial learning, and simply going deeper can effectively boost model robustness. Experiments
show that directly adding more layers to “deep” networks only marginally improves accuracy for
traditional image classification tasks. In contrast, substantial and consistent robustness improvement
is witnessed even by pushing the network capacity to an unprecedented scale, i.e., ResNet-638. This
phenomenon suggests that larger networks are encouraged for the task of adversarial learning, as the
learning target, i.e., adversarial images, is a much more complex distribution than clean images to fit.
In summary, our paper reveals two intriguing properties of adversarial training: (1) properly handling
normalization is essential for obtaining models with strong robustness; and (2) our so-called “deep”
networks are still shallow for the task of adversarial learning. We hope these findings can benefit
future research on understanding adversarial training and improving adversarial robustness.
2 Related Work
Adversarial training. Adversarial training constitutes the current foundation of state-of-the-arts
for defending against adversarial attacks. It is first developed in [6] where both clean images and
adversarial images are used for training. Kannan et al. [10] propose to improve robustness further
by encouraging the logits from the pairs of clean images and adversarial counterparts to be similar.
Instead of using both clean and adversarial images for training, Madry et al. [12] formulate adversarial
training as a min-max optimization and train models exclusively on adversarial images. However, as
these works mainly focus on demonstrating the effectiveness of their proposed mechanisms, a fair
and detailed diagnosis of adversarial training strategies remains as a missing piece. In this work, we
provide a detailed diagnosis which reveals two intriguing properties of training adversarial defenders.
Normalization Layers. Normalization is an effective technique to accelerate the training of deep
networks. Different methods are proposed to exploit batch-wise (e.g., BN [9]), layer-wise (e.g., layer
normalization [1]) or channel-wise (e.g., instance normalization [21] and group normalization [22])
information for estimating normalization statistics. Different from traditional vision tasks where
BN usually yields stronger performance than other normalization methods, we show that BN may
become a major obstacle for achieving strong robustness in the context of adversarial training, and
properly handling normalization is the essential key to improving adversarial robustness.
3 Adversarial Training Framework
As inconsistent adversarial training pipelines were applied in previous works [10, 23], it is hard to
identify which elements are important for obtaining robust models. To this end, we provide a unified
framework to train and to evaluate different models, for the sake of fair comparison.
Training Parameters. We use the publicly available adversarial training pipeline1 to train all models
with different strategies on ImageNet. We select ResNet-152 [7] as the baseline network, and apply
projected gradient descent (PGD) [12] as the adversarial attacker to generate adversarial examples
1https://github.com/facebookresearch/ImageNet-Adversarial-Training
2
during training. The hyper-parameters of the PGD attacker are: maximum perturbation of each pixel
 = 16, attack step size α = 1, number of attack iterations N = 30, and the targeted class is selected
uniformly at random over the 1000 ImageNet categories. We initialize the adversarial image by the
clean counterpart with probability = 0.2, or randomly within the allowed  cube with probability =
0.8. All models are trained for a total of 110 epochs, and we decrease the learning rate by 10× at the
35-th, 70-th, and 95-th epoch.
Evaluation. For performance evaluation, we mainly study adversarial robustness (rather than clean
image accuracy) in this paper. Specifically, we follow [10, 23] where the targeted PGD attacker is
chosen as the white-box attacker to evaluate robustness. The targeted class is selected uniformly at
random. We constrain the maximum perturbation of each pixel  = 16, set the attack step size α = 1,
and measure the robustness by defending against PGD attacker of 2000 attack iterations (PGD-2000).
As in [10, 23], we always initialize the adversarial perturbation from a random point within the
allowed -cube.
We apply these training and evaluation settings by default for all experiments, unless otherwise stated.
4 Exploring Normalization Techniques in Adversarial Training
4.1 On the Effects of Clean Images in Adversarial Training
In this part, we first elaborate on the effectiveness of different adversarial training strategies on model
robustness. Adversarial training can be dated back to [6], where Goodfellow et al. mix clean images
and their adversarial counterparts into each mini-batch for training. We choose this strategy as our
starting point, and the corresponding loss function is:
Jˆ(θ, x, y) = αJ(θ, xclean, y) + (1− α)J(θ, xadv, y), (1)
where J(·) is the loss function, θ is the network parameter, y is the ground-truth, and training pairs
{xclean, xadv} are comprised of clean images and their adversarial counterparts, respectively. The
parameter α balances the relative importance between clean image loss and adversarial image loss.
We set α = 0.5 following [6]. With our adversarial training framework, this model can achieve 20.9%
accuracy against PGD-2000 attacker. Besides this baseline, we then study the effectiveness of two
recently proposed adversarial training strategies [12, 10].
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Figure 1: The relationship between model robustness and
the portion of clean images used for training. We observe
that the strongest robustness can be obtained by training
completely without clean images, surpassing the baseline
model by 18.3% accuracy against PGD-2000 attacker.
Ratio of clean images. Different
from the canonical formulation in [6],
the min-max version in [12] involves
no clean images for adversarial train-
ing. We hereby investigate the re-
lationship between model robustness
and the ratio of clean images used for
training. Specifically, for each train-
ing mini-batch, we keep adversarial
images unchanged, but removing their
clean counterparts by 20%, 40%, 60%,
80% and 100%. We report the results
in Figure 1. Interestingly, removing a
portion of clean images from training
data can significantly improve model
robustness, and the strongest robust-
ness can be obtained by completely
removing clean images from the train-
ing set, i.e., it achieves an accuracy of 39.2% against PGD-2000 attacker, outperforming the baseline
model by a large margin of 18.3%.
Adversarial logits pairing. For performance comparison, we also explore the effectiveness of an
alternative training strategy, adversarial logits pairing (ALP) [10]. Compared with the canonical
formulation in [6], ALP imposes an additional loss to encourage the logits from the pairs of clean
images and adversarial counterparts to be similar. As shown in Figure 2, our re-implemented ALP
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Figure 2: Comprehensive robust evaluation on ImageNet. For models trained with different
strategies, we show their accuracy against a PGD attacker with 10 to 2000 iterations. Only the curve
of 100% adv + 0% clean becomes asymptotic when evaluating against attackers with more iterations.
obtains an accuracy of 23.0% against PGD-2000 attacker2, which outperforms the baseline model by
2.1%. Compared with the strategy of removing clean images, this improvement is much smaller.
Discussion. Given the results above, we conclude that training exclusively on adversarial images
is the most effective strategy for boosting model robustness. For example, by defending against
PGD-2000 attacker, the baseline strategy in [6] (referred to as 100% adv + 100% clean) obtains an
accuracy of 20.9%. Adding an loss of logits pairing [10] (referred to as 100% adv + 100% clean,
ALP) slightly improves the performance by 2.1%, while completely removing clean images [12, 23]
(referred to as 100% adv + 0% clean) boosts the accuracy by 18.3%. We further plot a comprehensive
evaluation curve of these three training strategies in Figure 2, by varying the number of PGD attack
iteration from 10 to 2000. Surprisingly, only 100% adv + 0% clean can ensure model robustness
against strong attacks, i.e., performance becomes asymptotic by allowing PGD attacker to perform
more attack iterations. Training strategies which involve clean images for training are suspicious to
result in worse robustness, if PGD attackers are allowed to perform more attack iterations. In the next
section, we will study how to make these training strategies, i.e., 100% adv + 100% clean and 100%
adv + 100% clean, ALP to secure their robustness against strong attacks.
4.2 The Devil is in the Batch Normalization
Two-domain hypothesis. Compared to feature maps of clean images, Xie et al. [23] show that
feature maps of their adversarial counterparts tend to be more noisy. Meanwhile, [11, 13, 4]
demonstrate it is possible to build classifiers to separate adversarial images from clean images. These
studies suggest that clean images and adversarial images are drawn from two different domains3.
This two-domain hypothesis may provide an explanation to the unexpected observation (see Sec. 4.1)
and we ask — why simply removing clean images from training data can largely boost adversarial
robustness?
As a crucial element for achieving state-of-the-arts on various vision tasks, BN [9] is widely adopted
in many network architectures, e.g., Inception [17], ResNet [7] and DenseNet [8]. The normalization
statistics of BN are estimated across different images. However, exploiting batch-wise statistics is a
challenging task if input images are drawn from different domains and networks fail to learn a unified
representation on this mixture distribution. Given our two-domain hypothesis, when training with
both clean and adversarial images, the usage of BN can be the key issue for causing the observed
weak robustness in Figure 2.
Based on the analysis above, an intuitive solution arise: accurately estimating normalization statistics
should enable models to train robustly even if clean images and adversarial images are mixed at each
training mini-batch. To this end, we explore two ways, where the mixture distribution is disentangled
at normalization layers, for validating this argument: (1) maintaining separate BNs for clean images
and adversarial images; or (2) replacing BNs with batch-unrelated normalization layers.
2Surprisingly, we note our reproduced ALP result is significantly stronger than the result reported in the
original ALP paper [10], as well in an independent study [3]. We identify this performance gap is mainly due to
different settings of training parameter, and provide a detailed diagnosis in the supplementary material.
3Or more precisely, “natural” images collected in the datasets and the corresponding adversarial images may
come from two different distributions.
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Figure 3: Disentangling the mixture distribution for normalization secures model robustness.
Unlike the blue curves in Figure 2, these new curves now become asymptotic when evaluating against
attackers with more iterations, which indicate that the networks using MBNadv can behave robustly
against PGD attackers with different attack iterations, even if clean images are used for training.
conv
BNadv+clean
ReLU
conv
MBNadv
ReLU
MBNclean
xadv,xclean
xadv xclean
xadv,xclean
Figure 4: Standard BN (left) estimates normalization
statistics on the mixture distribution. Our proposed
MBN (right) disentangles the distribution by con-
structing different mini-batch for clean and adversar-
ial images to estimate normalization statistics.
Training with Mixture BN. Current net-
work architectures estimate BN statistics using
mixed features from both clean and adversar-
ial images, which leads to weak model robust-
ness as shown in Figure 2. To disentangle
the mixed distribution for accurate statistics
estimation, we propose Mixture BN (MBN),
which constructs different mini-batches for
clean and adversarial images to estimate BN
statistics (illustrated in Figure 4), i.e., one set
of BNs exclusively for adversarial images (re-
ferred to as MBNadv), and another set of BNs
exclusively for clean images (referred to as
MBNclean). We do not change the structure of
other layers. We verify the effectiveness of
this new architecture with two (previously less robust) training strategies, i.e., 100% adv + 100%
clean and 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP.
At inference time, whether an image is adversarial or clean is unknown. We thereby measure the
performance of networks by applying either MBNadv or MBNclean separately. The results are shown
in Table 1. We find the performance is strongly related to how BN is trained: when using MBNclean,
the trained network achieves nearly the same clean image accuracy as the whole network trained
exclusively on clean images; when using MBNadv, the trained network achieves nearly the same
adversarial robustness as the whole network trained exclusively on adversarial images. Other factors,
like whether ALP is applied for training, only cause subtle differences in performance. We further
plot an extensive robustness evaluation curve of different training strategies in Figure 3. Unlike
Figure 2, we observe that networks using MBNadv now can secure their robustness against strong
attacks, e.g., the robustness is asymptotic when increasing attack iterations from 500 to 2000.
The results in Table 1 suggest that BN statistics characterize different model performance. For a
better understanding, we randomly sample 20 channels of a residual block and plot the corresponding
running statistics of MBNclean and MBNadv in Figure 5. It is shown that clean images and adversarial
images induce significantly different running statistics, though these images share the same set of
convolutional filters for feature extraction. This observation further supports that (1) clean images
and adversarial images come from two different domains; and (2) current networks fail to learn a
unified representation for both domains. Interestingly, we also find that adversarial images lead to
larger running mean and variance than clean images. This phenomenon is also consistent with the
observation that adversarial images produce noisy-patterns/outliers at feature space [23].
As a side note, the MBN structure is also used for training generative adversarial networks (GAN) [5].
Chintala et al. [2] suggest to construct each mini-batch with only real images or generated images
when training discriminators, as generated images and real images belong to different domains at
the early training stage. However, unlike our situation where BN statistics estimated on different
domains remain divergent after training, a successful training of GAN, i.e., able to generate natural
images with high quality, usually learns a unified set of BN statistics on real and generated images.
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Figure 5: Statistics of running mean and running variance of the proposed MBN on randomly sampled
20 channels in a ResNet-152’s res3 block. This suggests that clean and adversarial images induce
significantly different normalization statistics.
training strategy clean imageaccuracy (%)
0% adv + 100% clean 78.9
MBNclean, 100% adv + 100% clean +0.4
MBNclean, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP -0.5
training strategy PGD-2000accuracy (%)
100% adv + 0% clean 39.2
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean -0.9
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP -3.9
Table 1: MBN statistics characterize model
performance. Using MBNclean/MBNclean, the
trained models achieve strong performance
on clean/adversarial images.
training strategy PGD-2000accuracy (%)
100% adv + 0% clean 39.2
100% adv + 0% clean* +3.0
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean 38.3
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean* +1.6
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 35.3
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP* +2.8
Table 2: Enforcing a consistent behavior of BN
at the training stage and the testing stage signifi-
cantly boosts adversarial robustness. * denotes
that running statistics is used at the last 10 train-
ing epochs.
Training with batch-unrelated normalization layers. Instead of applying the proposed MBN
structure to disentangle the mixture distribution, we can also train with batch-unrelated normalization,
which avoids exploiting the batch dimension to calculate statistics, for the same propose. We choose
group normalization (GN) for this experiment, as GN can reach a comparable performance to BN
on various vision tasks [22]. Specifically, for each image, GN divides the channels into groups and
computes the normalization statistics within each group. By replacing all BNs with GNs, the mixture
training strategy 100% adv + 100% clean now can ensure robustness against strong attacks, i.e., the
model trained with GN achieves 39.5% accuracy against PGD-500, and increasing attack iterations
to 2000 only cause a marginal performance drop by 0.5% (39.0% accuracy against PGD-2000).
Exploring other batch-unrelated normalization in adversarial training remains as future work.
Exceptional cases. There are some situations where models directly trained with BN can also
ensure their robustness against strong attacks, even if clean images are included for adversarial
training. Our experiments show constraining the maximum perturbation of each pixel  to be a
smaller value, e.g.,  = 8, is one of these exceptional cases. [10, 14] also show that adversarial
training with clean images can secure robustness on small datasets, i.e., MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
Tiny ImageNet. Intuitively, generating adversarial images on these much simpler datasets or under
a smaller perturbation constraint induces a smaller gap between these two domains, and therefore
making it easier for networks to learn a unified representation on clean and adversarial images.
Nonetheless, in this paper, we stick to the standard protocol in [10, 23] where adversarial robustness
is evaluated on ImageNet with the perturbation constraint  = 16.
4.3 Revisiting Statistics Estimation of BN
Inconsistent behavior of BN. As the concept of “batch” is not legitimate at inference time, BN
behaves differently at training and testing [9]: during training, the mean and variance are computed
on each mini-batch, referred to as batch statistics; during testing, there is no actual normalization
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Figure 6: Comparison of batch statistics and running statistics of BN on randomly sampled 20
channels in a ResNet-152’s res3 block. We observe that batch mean can converge to running mean,
while batch variance still differs from running variance.
performed — BN uses the mean and variance pre-computed on the training set (often by running
average) to normalize data, referred to as running statistics.
For traditional classification tasks, batch statistics usually converge to running statistics by the end of
training, thus (practically) making the impact of this inconsistent behavior negligible. Nonetheless,
this empirical assumption may not hold in the context of adversarial training. We check this statistics
matching of models trained with the strategy 100% adv + 0% clean, where the robustness against
strong attacks is secured. We randomly sample 20 channels from a residual block, and plot the batch
statistics computed on two randomly sampled mini-batches, together with the pre-computed running
statistics. In Figure 6, interestingly, we observe that batch mean is almost equivalent to running mean,
while batch variance does not converge to running variance yet on certain channels. Given this fact,
we then study if this inconsistent behavior of BN affects model robustness in adversarial training.
A heuristic approach. Instead of developing a new training strategy to make batch statistics converge
to running statistics by the end of training, we explore a more heuristic solution: applying pre-
computed running statistics for model training during the last 10 epochs. We report the performance
comparison in Table 2. By enabling BNs to behave consistently at training and testing, this approach
can further boost the model robustness by 3.0% with the training strategy 100% adv + 0% clean. We
also successfully validate the generality of this approach on other two robust training strategies. More
specifically, it can improve the model robustness under the training strategies MBNadv, 100% adv
+ 100% clean and MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP by 1.6% and 2.8%, respectively. These
results suggest that model robustness can be benefited from a consistent behavior of BN at training
and testing. Moreover, we note this approach does not incur any additional training budgets.
4.4 Beyond Adversarial Robustness
On the importance of training convolutional filters adversarially. In Section 4.2, we study the
performance of models where the mixture distribution is disentangled for normalization — by
applying MBNclean or MBNadv, the trained models achieve strong performance on either clean
images or adversarial images. This result suggests that clean and adversarial images share the same
convolutional filters to effectively extract features. We further explore whether the filters learned
exclusively on adversarial images can extract features effectively on clean images, and vice versa.
We first take a model trained with the strategy 100% adv + 0% clean, and then finetune BNs using
only clean images for a few epochs. Interestingly, we find the accuracy on clean images can be
significantly boosted from 62.3% to 73%. These result indicates that convolutional filters learned
solely on adversarial images can also be effectively applied to clean images. However, we find the
opposite direction does not work — convolutional filters learned on clean images cannot extract
features robustly on adversarial images (e.g., 0% accuracy against PGD-2000 after finetuning BNs
with adversarial images). This phenomenon indicates the importance of training convolutional filters
adversarially, as such learned filters can also extract features from clean images effectively.
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Figure 7: Compared to traditional image classification tasks, adversarial training exhibits a stronger
demand on deeper networks.
Limitation of adversarial training. We note that our adversarially trained models exhibit a perfor-
mance tradeoff between clean image accuracy and adversarial robustness — the training strategies
that achieve strong model robustness usually result in relatively low accuracy on clean images. For
example, 100% adv + 0% clean, MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean and MBNadv, 100% adv + 100%
clean, ALP only report 62.3%, 64.4% and 65.9% of clean image accuracy. By replacing BNs with
GNs, 100% adv + 100% clean achieves much better clean image accuracy, i.e., 67.5%, as well
maintaining strong robustness. We note that this tradeoff is also observed in the prior work [20].
Training models adversarially with strong performance on both clean images and adversarial images
remains an open question for future research.
5 Going Deeper in Adversarial Training
As discussed in Section 4.2, current networks are not capable of learning a unified representation
on clean and adversarial images. It may suggest that the “deep” network we used, i.e., ResNet-152,
still underfits the complex distribution of adversarial images, as well motivates us to apply larger
networks for adversarial training. We simply instantiate the concept of larger networks by going
deeper, i.e., adding more residual blocks. For traditional image classification tasks, the benefits
brought by adding more layers to “deep” networks is diminishing, e.g., the blue curve in Figure 7
shows that the improvement of clean image accuracy becomes marginal once the network depth
reaches ResNet-200.
To better observe the possible underfitting phenomenon, we train deeper models exclusively on
adversarial images. We apply the heuristic policy in Section 4.3 to mitigate the possible effects
brought by BN. The results are reported in Figure 7. We observe that adversarial learning task exhibits
a strong “thirst” on deeper networks to obtain stronger robustness. For example, increasing depth
from ResNet-152 to ResNet-338 significantly improves the model robustness by 2.4%, while the
corresponding improvement in the “clean” training setting (referred to as 0% adv + 100% clean)
is only 0.5%. Moreover, this observation still holds even by pushing the network capacity to an
unprecedented scale, i.e., ResNet-638. These results indicate that our so-called “deep” networks (e.g.,
ResNet-152) are still shallow for the task of adversarial learning, and larger networks should be used
for fitting this complex distribution. This finding also coincides with the recent theoretical study [15]
which argues that robust adversarial learning needs more complex classifiers.
Besides adversarial robustness, we also observe a consistent performance gain on clean image
accuracy by increasing network depth. Our deepest network, ResNet-638, achieves an accuracy of
68.7% on clean images, outperforming the relatively shallow network ResNet-152 by 6.1%.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we reveal two intriguing properties of adversarial training: (1) conducting normalization
in the right manner is essential for training robust models; and (2) our so-called “deep” networks are
still shallow for the task of adversarial learning. These discoveries may also be inherently related
to our two-domain hypothesis — clean images and adversarial images are drawn from different
distributions. We hope these findings can facilitate fellow researchers for better understanding of
adversarial training as well as further improvement of adversarial robustness.
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A Diagnosis on ALP Training Parameters
In the main paper, we note that our reproduced ALP significantly outperforms the results reported in
[10], as well in an independent study [3]. The main differences between our version and the original
ALP implementation lie in parameter settings, and are detailed as follows:
• learning rate decay: the original ALP decays the learning rate every two epochs at an
exponential rate of 0.94, while ours decays the learning rate by 10× at the 35-th, 70-th and
95-th epoch. To ensure these two policies reach similar learning rates by the end of training,
the total number of training epochs of the exponential decay setting and the step-wise decay
setting are set as 220 and 110 respectively.
• initial learning rate: the original ALP sets the initial learning rate as 0.045 whereas we set it
as 0.1 in our implementation.
• training optimizer: the original ALP uses RMSProp as the optimizer while we use Momen-
tum SGD (M-SGD).
• PGD initialization during training: the original ALP initializes the adversarial perturbation
from a random point within the allowed  cube; while we initialize the adversarial image by
its clean counterpart with probability = 0.2, or randomly within the allowed the  cube with
probability = 0.8.
• number of GPUs: the original ALP uses 50 GPUs for adversarial training, while ours uses
128 GPUs.
• network backbone: the original ALP reports results based on Inception-v3 and ResNet-101,
while our backbone is ResNet-152.
• PGD-N for training: the original ALP uses PGD-10 for training, while we use PGD-30 for
training.
PGD-N for network #GPUs PGD initialization optimizer initial lr lr decay accuracy (%)training PGD-10 PGD-2000
10 ResNet-101
48 P(-cube) = 1.0
RMSProp 0.045
exponential 38.1 2.1
step-wise
47.0 2.7
0.1
50.2 0.8
M-SGD
48.2 0.7
P(-cube) = 0.8
P(clean) = 0.2
47.0 2.1
128
47.5 2.9
ResNet-152
47.3 3.3
30 48.8 23.0
Table 3: The results of ALP re-implementations under different parameter settings. We show that
applying stronger attackers for training, e.g., change from PGD-10 to PGD-30, is the most important
factor for achieving strong robustness. Other parameters, like optimizer, do not lead to significant
robustness changes.
By following the parameter settings listed in the ALP paper4, we can train a ResNet-101 with an
accuracy of 38.1% against PGD-10. The ResNet-101 performance reported in the ALP paper is 30.2%
accuracy against an attack suite5. This ∼8% performance gap is possibly due to different attacker
settings in evaluation. However, by evaluating this model against PGD-2000, we are able to obtain
results which are similar to [3], i.e., [3] reports ALP obtains 0% accuracy, and in our implementation
the accuracy is 2.1%.
Given these different settings, we change them one by one to train corresponding models adversarially.
The results are summarized in Table 3. Surprisingly, we find the most important factor for the
performance gap between original ALP paper and ours is the attacker strength used for training — by
changing the attacker from PGD-10 to PGD-30 for training, the robustness against PGD-2000 can be
increased by 19.7%. Other parameters, like network backbones or the GPU number, do not lead to
significant performance changes.
4For easier implementation, we apply 48 GPUs (which can be distributed over 6 8-GPU machines) for
adversarial training, instead of using the original number, i.e., 50 GPUs.
5This attack suite contains 8 different attackers, including PGD-10. However, due to the vague description of
parameter settings in this attack suite, we are not able to reproduce it.
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PGD-N
for
training
accuracy against PGD-2000 (%)
100% adv + 0% clean 100% adv + 100% clean 100% adv + 100% clean,ALP
MBNadv,
100% adv + 100% clean
MBNadv,
100% adv + 100% clean,
ALP
30 39.2 20.9 23.0 38.3 35.3
20 -1.0 -7.3 -3.8 -4.2 +0.5
10 -2.4 -17.7 -19.7 -5.5 -1.4
5 -3.3 -20.9 -22.7 -7.1 -2.4
Table 4: Robustness evaluation of models adversarially trained with PGD-{30, 20, 10, 5} at-
tackers. We observe that decreasing the number of PGD attack iteration for training usually leads to
weaker robustness, while the amount of degraded robustness is largely related to training strategies.
training strategy
accuracy against PGD-2000 (%)
PGD-5 PGD-10 PGD-20 PGD-30
100% adv + 0% clean 35.9 36.8 38.2 39.2
100% adv + 0% clean* +1.9 +2.4 +1.8 +3.0
MBN, 100% adv + 0% clean 31.2 32.8 34.1 38.3
MBN, 100% adv + 0% clean* +3.0 +3.3 +2.4 +1.6
MBN, 100% adv + 0% clean, ALP 32.9 33.9 35.8 35.3
MBN, 100% adv + 0% clean, ALP* +2.5 +2.8 +1.3 +2.8
Table 5: Validating the effectiveness of applying running statis-
tics in training on more settings. We observe this heuristic
policy can boost robustness on all settings. * denotes that run-
ning statistics is used at the last 10 training epochs.
training accuracy against
batch size PGD-2000 (%)
4096 42.2
512 -0.2
1024 +0.9
2048 +1.1
8192 -0.3
Table 6: Performance eval-
uation of models trained
with different batch size.
The best performance can
be achieved by training
with a batch size of 2048.
B Exploring the Impact of Parameter Settings in Adversarial Training
In this section, we explore the impact of different training parameters on model performance.
B.1 PGD-N for Training
As suggested in Table 3, the number of attack iteration used for training is an important factor
for model robustness. We hereby provide a detailed diagnosis of model performance trained with
PGD-{5, 10, 20}6 for different training strategies (not limit to 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP).
We report the performance in Table 4, and observe that decreasing the number of PGD attack
iteration used for training usually leads to weaker robustness. Nonetheless, we note the amount of
this performance change is largely related to training strategies. For strategies that cannot lead to
models with strong robustness, i.e., 100% adv + 100% clean and 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP,
this robustness degradation is extremely severe (which is similar to the observation in Table 3).
For example, by training with PGD-5, these two strategies obtains nearly no robustness, i.e., ∼0%
accuracy against PGD-2000. While for strategies that can ensure model robustness against strong
attacks, changing from PGD-30 to PGD-5 for training lose robustness at a reasonable amount.
B.2 Applying Running Statistics in Training
In Section 4.3 (of the main paper), we study the effectiveness of applying running statistics in training.
We hereby test this heuristic policy on more settings. Specifically, we consider 3 strategies, each
trained with 4 different attackers (i.e., PGD-{5, 10, 20, 30}), which results in 12 different settings.
We report the result in Table 5. We observe this heuristic policy can boost robustness on all settings,
which further supports the importance of enforcing BN to behave consistently at training and testing.
B.3 Batch Size in Training
The default number of training batch size is 4096. We hereby study the model performance when
training with the batch size of {512, 1024, 2048, 8192}, respectively. Without loss of generality,
we study the training strategy 100% adv + 0% clean. The heuristic policy in Section 4.3 (of the
main paper) is applied to achieve stronger robustness. Compared to the default setting (i.e., 4096
images/batch), training with smaller batch size leads to better robustness. For example, changing
6For PGD-5 and PGD-10, we set the attack step size α to be 4 and 2, respectively.
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batch size from 4096 to 1024 or 2048 can improve the model robustness by ∼1%. While training
with much smaller (i.e., 512 images/batch) or much larger (i.e., 8192 images/batch) batch size results
in a slight performance degradation.
C Performance of Adversarially Trained Models
In the main paper, our study is driven by improving adversarial robustness (measured by the accuracy
against PGD-2000), while leaving the performance on clean images ignored. For the completeness of
performance evaluation, we list the clean image performance of these adversarially trained models in
Table 7. Moreover, to facilitate performance comparison in future works, we list the corresponding
accuracy against PGD-{10, 20, 100, 500} in this table as well.
network
training PGD-N
setting
accuracy (%)
batch for clean PGDsize training 10 20 100 500 2000
ResNet-152
4096
30
100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 73.5 48.8 46.3 34.1 27.3 23.0
100% adv + 100% clean 78.0 56.2 53.0 35.6 26.6 20.9
100% adv + 80% clean 77.4 56.8 54.6 39.6 28.7 20.3
100% adv + 60% clean 75.5 54.6 52.1 40.3 23.5 15.3
100% adv + 40% clean 73.9 54.1 51.5 40.2 33.6 29.1
100% adv + 20% clean 68.0 54.6 51.5 40.6 34.6 32.1
100% adv + 0% clean 62.3 52.5 50.0 41.7 39.6 39.2
100% adv + 0% clean* 62.1 52.4 50.3 43.9 42.6 42.2
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean 64.4 51.8 49.1 40.9 38.8 38.3
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean* 64.2 52.5 50.0 42.1 40.5 39.9
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 65.9 47.3 45.0 38.3 35.9 35.3
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP* 64.3 49.0 47.2 40.4 38.6 38.1
GN, 100% adv + 100% clean 67.5 52.1 49.3 41.9 39.5 39.0
20
100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 72.7 50.1 47.6 33.4 25.2 19.2
100% adv + 100% clean 78.4 55.9 52.5 31.7 20.0 13.6
100% adv + 0% clean 62.5 54.1 51.1 41.8 39.0 38.2
100% adv + 0% clean* 65.4 53.9 51.0 42.7 40.8 40.0
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean 67.9 52.8 49.9 39.3 35.5 34.1
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean* 67.2 52.7 49.9 40.2 37.2 36.5
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 68.1 48.8 46.7 39.5 36.7 35.8
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP* 67.4 50.0 47.7 40.3 37.4 37.1
10
100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 74.9 47.3 47.1 22.4 7.3 3.3
100% adv + 100% clean 78.4 56.6 55.1 28.8 7.1 3.2
100% adv + 0% clean 66.0 53.6 50.9 41.1 38.0 36.8
100% adv + 0% clean* 65.9 53.5 50.7 42.3 39.9 39.2
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean 68.7 53.5 49.9 38.7 34.3 32.8
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean* 67.8 52.6 49.8 40.0 36.9 36.1
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 68.7 49.0 46.8 38.9 35.4 33.9
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP* 67.7 50.0 47.7 40.2 37.4 36.7
5
100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 75.0 49.6 37.6 5.7 0.8 0.3
100% adv + 100% clean 78.6 41.5 17.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
100% adv + 0% clean 67.0 54.0 50.5 40.7 37.5 35.9
100% adv + 0% clean* 66.9 53.6 50.4 41.5 38.8 37.8
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean 69.3 53.0 49.8 38.0 33.3 31.2
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean* 68.9 53.1 49.8 39.8 35.9 34.2
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP 69.2 49.6 46.8 38.9 34.9 32.9
MBNadv, 100% adv + 100% clean, ALP* 69.2 50.4 48.3 40.3 37.0 35.4
512
30 100% adv + 0% clean*
62.6 52.4 50.4 43.8 42.4 42.0
1024 63.1 53.3 51.0 44.6 43.5 43.1
2048 62.7 53.3 50.7 45.0 43.7 43.3
8196 61.8 52.1 49.8 43.4 42.3 41.9
ResNet-200
4096
63.5 53.8 51.4 45.1 43.9 43.8
ResNet-338 65.4 55.5 53.2 46.6 45.1 44.6
ResNet-518 66.7 56.7 54.4 48.1 46.4 46.2
ResNet-638 67.2 57.2 54.8 48.7 47.1 46.7
Table 7: For easier benchmarking in future works, we list the detailed performance of adversarially
trained models. * denotes running statistics is used at the last 10 training epochs.
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